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In the last few years quite a few international lawyers have been
complaining about the 1985 termination (with effect on April 7, 1986)
by the United States of its 1946 declaration accepting the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.' Little attention has
been paid to the fact that during the forty years since the making of
this declaration many other states have changed their declarations,
often several times, 2 in order to adapt them to the Court's jurisprudence
and to new circumstances. By 1985, the United States declaration was
in fact obsolete, and some of the reservations contained in it proved
more harmful than useful.' It should have been changed long ago,
* Woodruff Professor of International Law, School of Law, University of Georgia;
Bemis Professor of International Law, Emeritus, Harvard Law School. This is a revised
version of a paper prepared for the American Bar Association's Blue Ribbon Committee
on the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in 1987.
1 See, e.g., D'Amato, The United States Should Accept, by a New Declaration,
the General Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 331
(1986). For the text of the United States 1946 declaration, see 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S.
No. 1598, 4 Bevans 140, 1 U.N.T.S. 9. For the notice terminating U.S. declaration,
see 24 I.L.M. 1742-45 (1985); see also 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 163-65 (1985). For a thorough
analysis of various aspects of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, see Tim INTER-
NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (L. Damrosch ed. 1987) [hereinafter
Tim COURT AT A CROSSROADS]; see also TBE UNITED STATES AND TE COMPULSORY
JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (A.C. Arend ed. 1986) (Papers
presented at a workshop sponsored by the Center for Law and National Security at
the University of Virginia in 1985).
2 For instance, the United Kingdom changed its 1940 declaration in 1955 (twice),
1957, 1958, 1963 and 1969. For the latest declaration, see 1985-86 I.C.J.Y.B. 91 (1986).
3 See D'Amato and O'Connell, United States Experience at the International Court
of Justice, in Tim COURT AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 1, at 403, 404. See also
statement by the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, Abraham D. Sofaer,
86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1, 67-68 (Jan. 1986).
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but when the crisis arose there was no substitute available and no
adequate study of the conditions to be included in a new declaration
which would put the United States on a par with the more-cautious
other states. At the time, cancellation of the declaration appeared
easier than replacing it with a better one.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the possibility that in the
not-too-distant future the Government of the United States will re-
consider the matter and decide to renew its declaration accepting the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The
debate at that time will primarily revolve around the conditions of
that acceptance.
I. THE BASIC ALTERNATWES
The United States has three main alternatives concerning the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court: acceptance without any substantial
conditions, acceptance with broad, practically unlimited conditions,
and acceptance with clearly defined, limited conditions.
Acceptance without any substantial conditions proved popular at
the beginning of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Some
of these declarations have expired, some have been drastically changed,
and a few have been added by some new States. It is not likely,
however, that the United States would choose this road.
Another possibility, at the other end of the spectrum, would be to
curtail drastically the scope of the new United States declaration.
Following the example of the so-called Connally Amendment to the
original draft of the 1946 declaration, which excluded from the juris-
diction of the Court "disputes with regard to matters which are es-
sentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America
as determined by the United States of America," the United States
might enter a reservation excluding the Court's jurisdiction over "dis-
putes which, in the opinion of the United States, affect the vital interests
of the United States." When considering such a broad, subjective
reservation, however, it must be remembered that, because of the
reciprocity rule, as a United States reservation is broadened, the United
States ability to utilize the Court when other states violate its rights
or those of its citizens is lessened. Consequently, in this situation the
proposed cure might be worse than the disease, and would in fact
deprive the United States of any possibility of bringing any other state
before the Court. This is especially true as other states are more likely
to invoke such a reservation than is the United States, which is more
susceptible to the pressure of public opinion.
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To avoid the danger inherent in such subjective reservations, the
content of which depends largely on the subjective judgment of the
defendant party, any special interests that the United States might wish
to protect would be better safeguarded by more precise reservations.
This safeguard can be achieved by allowing the International Court
of Justice to objectively determine in each case whether the reservation
actually applies to the dispute presented to the Court, while at the
same time carefully restricting the latitude of the Court's discretion.
The more precise a reservation is, the more difficult it is for an
opponent to persuade the Court to deprive the party making the
declaration of the protection embodied in the reservation.
Thus, the interests of the United States might be best protected,
and the rule of law in international relations best advanced, by a more
focused and less drastic revision of the United States declaration. The
remainder of this essay sets forth and examines several provisions
which might be included in a future declaration in order to modernize
it and to correct the deficiencies in the 1946 declaration.
II. PROPOSED DRAFT OF UNITED STATES DECLARATION
1. The United States of America recognizes as compulsory ipso facto
and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting
the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice in all legal disputes hereafter arising concerning:
(a) the interpretation or application of any treaty to which the United
States of America and the other party or parties to the dispute are
parties and which has been registered with the United Nations in
accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations; or
(b) the interpretation or application of any rule of customary in-
ternational law, except when a particular rule has been expressly rejected
by the Government of the United States of America at the time of
its formation and prior to the commencement of the dispute; or
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute
a breach of an international obligation, provided that the dispute does
not relate to facts involving disclosure of information the presentation
of which would be contrary to the essential security interests of the
United States; or
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach
of an international obligation.
2. This declaration does not apply to:
(a) disputes the resolution of which the parties shall entrust to other
tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may
be concluded in the future; or
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(b) disputes with regard to matters which traditionally, in the practice
of the United States, have been considered as essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America; or
(c) disputes relating to any question which affects the national security
of the United States of America or of a State party to a collective
security arrangement to which the United States of America is also a
party, except when one of the parties to the dispute has referred the
matter to the Security Council of the United Nations or the appropriate
regional collective security organization and the Security Council or
the organization has recommended that certain specific legal questions
be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice; or
(d) disputes relating to the interpretation or application of a mul-
tilateral treaty, unless all the parties to that treaty have agreed that
any decision rendered in any such dispute between two or more of
them will be binding upon all of them; or
(eJ disputes submitted by a State which has accepted the jurisdiction
of the Court with respect to such disputes less than one year prior to
the filing of the application bringing the dispute before the Court.
3. This Declaration may be modified or terminated with effect as
from the moment of expiration of six months after notice has been
given to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, except that in
relfon to any state with a shorter period of termination, the noti-
ficatiohl by the United States of America shall take effect at the end
of such shorter peri6d, and in relation to any state which may terminate
its declaration as from the moment of notification, the notification
by the United States shall take effect as from the moment of noti-
fication.
III. COMMENT ON THE PRoPosED DECLARATION
The comments which follow are intended to explain the reasons for
particular limitations of jurisdiction of the Court, and for the exceptions
(reservations) thereto, that are included in the proposed text of the
declaration.
A. Basic Limitations on the Acceptance of the Court's Jurisdiction
),heambular .ctause
The United States of America recognizes as compulsory ipso facto
'knd without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting
the tame .obligation, the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice ii' dl legal disputes hereafter arising concerning:
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Reciprocity. This preambular paragraph contains the usual formula
for accepting the jurisdiction of the Court. It emphasizes the condition
of reciprocity by employing the phrase "in relation to any other state
accepting the same obligation."
It may be noted that both in Article 36 of the Statute of the Court
and in many declarations, the idea of reciprocity appears in two forms.
Article 36(2) provides that the declarations shall apply "in relation to
any other State accepting the same obligation," and Article 36(3) allows
the making of declarations "on condition of reciprocity on the part
of several or certain States." Some declarations repeat the first formula;
some simply accept the jurisdiction of the Court "on condition of
reciprocity"; several use a double formula, recognizing the jurisdiction
of the Court "in relation to any other State accepting the same
obligation," i.e., on condition of reciprocity.
Only Brazil applied Article 36(3) literally and made its 1921 declaration
subject to the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction "by two at least
of the Powers permanently represented on the Council of the League
of Nations." ' 4 The suggestion has been made that the United States
should not be out of step with other major powers and should condition
the coming into force of a future declaration upon the acceptance of
the jurisdiction of the Court to at least a similar extent by the four
other permanent members of the Security Council (of which, at present,
only the United Kingdom is bound by the optional clause).
In 1959, a committee of the American Bar Association suggested
another method to ensure reciprocity. It proposed that the United
States should agree to withdraw its subjective domestic jurisdiction
reservation if all other nations which have made similar reservations
would withdraw them at the same time, and if "as many new adherences
as possible to Article 36 of the Statute of the Court" would be deposited
simultaneously with the withdrawal of the reservation.5
Legal disputes. The proposed declaration, like the previous one, is
clearly limited to "legal disputes." The International Court of Justice
has adopted a broad definition of legal disputes, and it considers that
even in a "mixed" dispute, involving both legal and political issues,
4 See M. HUDSON, TIE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-1942,
at 648 (1943); Briggs, Reservations to the Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdication of
the International Court of Justice, 93 RECUEIL DES CouRs 227, 241 (1958).
' American Bar Association, Section of International and Comparative Law, Report
on the Self-Judging Aspect of the United States' Domestic Jurisdiction Reservation
with Respect to the International Court of Justice 62 (1959).
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it is entitled to deal with the legal questions submitted to it.6 It would
seem undesirable to exclude from the jurisdiction of the Court such
legal questions, though it might be possible to devise a formula for
excluding from its jurisdiction "any dispute that necessarily involves
the concurrent consideration of political questions." It might be better
to deal with this matter indirectly by allowing a party to a dispute to
terminate the proceedings before the Court by submitting the matter
to the Security Council of the United Nations, or to a regional collective
security organization, as suggested in reservation (c) discussed below.
Non-retroactivity. The proposed declaration is not retroactive; it applies
only to "disputes hereafter arising," namely, to disputes arising after
the date of deposit of the new declaration with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations. This proposed limitation also appears in the
1946 United States declaration. As the Permanent Court of International
Justice pointed out in the German Interests in Upper Silesia Case, a
dispute arises "as soon as one of the Governments concerned points
out that the attitude adopted by the other conflicts with its own views." 7
Interpretation and application of treaties
(a) the interpretation or application of any treaty to which the United
States of America and the other party or parties to the dispute are
parties, and which has been registered with the United Nations in
accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
In the proposed declaration, the United States would recognize the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice over
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of any treaty to
which the United States and the other party or parties to the dispute
are parties.
This formulation departs from the language of Article 36(2)(a) of
the Statute of the Court and the 1946 United States declaration, both
6 In The United States Diplomatic Staff in Tehran Case, the International Court
of Justice pointed out that no provision of the Statute or Rules contemplates that the
Court should decline to take cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely because
that dispute has other aspects, "however important," and that, in particular, "never
has the view been put forward before that, because a legal dispute submitted to the
Court is only one aspect of a political dispute, the Court should decline to resolve
for the parties the legal questions at issue between them." United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 19-20, paras. 36-37. These
statements were repeated by the Court in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Jurisdiction) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392,
439, para. 105.
1 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6, at 14.
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of which simply refer to disputes concerning "the interpretation of a
treaty." The new language of this subparagraph follows the phrasing
of hundreds of so-called compromissory clauses contained in inter-
national agreements, which usually provide for the reference to the
Court or to an arbitral tribunal of disputes relating to the interpretation
or application of a particular agreement.' The United States is a party
to 40 multilateral agreements containing such clauses. 9 As there might
be objections to the adjudication of disputes relating to certain old
or unpublished agreements, it is suggested that the declaration be
further limited to encompass only those treaties "registered with the
United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations."
A more extreme change would restrict United States acceptance to
only the interpretation or application of treaties and would omit entirely
paragraph (b) of the declaration relating to other rules of international
law, perhaps omitting paragraphs (c) and (d) also. The main reason
for such a step would be to address the concern that the reluctance
of states to accept the jurisdiction of the Court is due to their fear
that the Court will apply to them some rules of customary law which
they have been reluctant to accept but which the Court may consider
sufficiently crystallized to justify their general application.
On the other hand, states may be more willing to accept the juris-
diction of the Court if it were limited to disputes relating to the
interpretation or application of international agreements, both bilateral
and multilateral. This option has been exercised by some states, which
have restricted the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36 of the
Statute to specified treaties. Thus far, no official objections have been
raised to the validity of such declarations. 10 It would be possible,
8 See Sohn, Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Interpretation and Application
of Treaties, 150 REctIU DES COURS 195, 259 (1976); Charney, Compromissory Clauses
and the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 855,
856 (1987).
9 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE
PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE, S. ExEc. REP. No. 50,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-41 (1984); see also Morrison, Treaties as a Source of Juris-
diction, Especially in U.S. Practice, in THE COURT AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 1,
at 58, 80-81.
10 For instance, the International Court of Justice noted in the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co. Case that the 1930 declaration of Persia (later Iran) granted to the Court jurisdiction
"only when a dispute relates to the application of a treaty or convention accepted by
Iran." Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (Preliminary Objection) (U.K. v. Iran), (July 22)
1952 I.C.J. 93, 103. Egypt accepted the Court's jurisdiction even more specifically by
1988l
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therefore, for the United States to file a declaration accepting the
jurisdiction of the Court limited to the "interpretation and application
of international agreements to which the United States is a party.""
While such a limited declaration would be much narrower in scope,
its advantage might be that it would be less necessary to make broad
exceptions to it. Of the reservations listed in Section 2 of the proposed
declaration only a few might still be necessary - for instance, the
exception relating to disputes the resolution of which has been entrusted
by the parties to another tribunal. This approach would simplify the
declaration and would probably make a better general impression than
would a declaration with a flock of reservations.
Customary international law
(b) the interpretation or application of any rule of customary inter-
national law, except when a particular rule has been expressly rejected
by the Government of the United States of America prior to the
commencement of the dispute;
This subparagraph differs in several respects from the corresponding
clauses in Article 36 of the Statute of the Court and in the 1946 United
States declaration, which provided for the jurisdiction of the Court
over all legal disputes concerning "any question of international law."
These clauses contain a very broad jurisdictional grant, and it might
be desirable to restrict it in several respects. First, it should be made
clear that this clause refers to "customary" international law, which-
as specified in Article 38 of the Statute of the Court-is evidenced by
the practice of states, and depends on the general acceptance by the
vast majority of states. 12 As international law does not require complete
unanimity of all the states, more than 160 today, it is possible that
some states may have dissented from a particular rule. Such dissent
limiting it to disputes relating to "the Suez Canal and the arrangements for its
operation," thus referring indirectly to the Convention of Constantinople of 1888.
For the text of Egypt's declaration, see 1957-1958 I.C.J.Y.B. 211 (1957); for the text
of the Constantinople Convention, 171 TIrE CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES 241 (C.
Parry ed. 1978).
l, See Sohn, International Tribunals: Past, Present and Future, 46 A.B.A.J. 23,
25 (1960). The same result could be accomplished by concluding a separate treaty
conferring on the Court jurisdiction over disputes relating to the interpretation or
application of a clearly specified category of treaties. See Sohn, Step-by-Step Acceptance
of the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 1964 AM. Soc. INT'L L.
PROC. 131, 132 (1964).




may not stop the emergence of a rule, but such a rule does not
necessarily bind the dissenting states.'3 It would seem useful, therefore,
to specify in the proposed declaration that where a dispute relates to
a rule which the United States has clearly rejected at the time of its
formation, the United States will not be bound to submit such a
dispute to the Court so long as the rejection of the rule occured before
the commencement of the dispute at issue. If, however, the United
States has remained silent when the new rule has been generally agreed
upon, it may not object to the submission to the Court of a dispute
relating to it. Finally, in order to make this provision parallel to the
one relating to treaties, it is suggested that the clause should apply
only to disputes relating to "the interpretation or application" of any
rule of customary international law.
Facts constituting breaches of international law
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute
a breach of an international obligation, provided that the dispute
does not relate to facts involving disclosure of information the pres-
entation of which would be contrary to the essential security interests
of the United States;
In this provision, which appears in both Article 36 of the Statute
of the Court and in the 1946 United States declaration, a clause has
been added to address the touchy situation that may arise where, in
order to explain certain facts involved in a dispute, sensitive classified
information would have to be disclosed. To avoid this, a formula
excluding such disputes has been inserted, which is modeled on Article
302 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.
That article provides that, without prejudice to the right of a State
Party to resort to the procedures for the settlement of disputes provided
for in that Convention, "nothing in this Convention shall be deemed
to require a State Party, in the fulfillment of its obligations under
this Convention, to supply information the disclosure of which is
contrary to the essential interests of its security.' ' 4 This provision's
1 See Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Per-
sistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 457 (1985); Colson, How
Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be, 61 WAsH. L. REv. 957 (1986); Charney,
The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law,
56 BR. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1985).
" For text of the Law of the Sea Convention, see United Nations, The Law of
the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5.
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applicability is broader in scope than the clause proposed for the new
declaration, but its spirit is clearly similar.
Reparation for breaches of international obligations
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach
of an international obligation.
No change has been made in this provision, which appears both in
Article 36 of the Statute of the Court and in the 1946 United States
declaration. It might be suggested, however, that subparagraphs (c)
and(d) be omitted completely, and replaced by a completely different
provision which would ensure that the Court would not decide any
issues relating to breaches of international obligations. Some states are
reluctant to submit to the Court concrete cases of violations of in-
ternational law in which the Court would have to decide not only
whether a party to the dispute has committed a violation of inter-
national law, but also what should be the remedy for the violation
(for instance, restitution or compensation). In some recent cases, the
parties to a dispute have asked the Court instead to decide only what
are the applicable "principles and rules of international law," and the
Court has accepted this limitation on the scope of its functions and
the character of the judgment to be rendered. 5 If the United States
find this approach desirable, it may restrict its declaration accepting
the jurisdiction of the Court to "disputes in which the International
Court of Justice is requested to decide only the principles and rules
applicable to the questions presented to the Court by the parties to
the dispute."
B. Exceptions
Sections 2 and 3 of the proposed declaration contain various ex-
ceptions (or reservations) to the Court's jurisdiction. A few of them
also appear in the 1946 United States declaration, but some of them
have been revised to take into account various criticisms. In addition,
several other exceptions have been added; some are modeled on re-
servations made by other states; a few are new.
13 See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (FRG v. Den., FRG v. Neth.),
1969 I.C.J. 3, 13, para. 2, and 53 para. 101(c) (Feb. 20).
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Submission to other tribunals
(a) disputes the resolution of which the parties shall entrust to other
tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may
be concluded in the future.
The proposed declaration would not apply to disputes for which the
parties have made other arrangements, entrusting them to other tri-
bunals. This exception applies both in case of agreements already in
existence at the time of the declaration and to those which may be
concluded in the future.
This clause, which also appeared in the 1946 United States decla-
ration, is contained in some form in the declarations of most other
nations. The clause does not erode the rule of law in international
relations, but merely recognizes the fact that nations can agree that
tribunals other than the International Court of Justice are better suited
to assist in the peaceful resolution of certain types of disputes.
Domestic matters
(b) disputes with regard to matters which traditionally, in the practice
of the United States, have been considered as essentially witlin the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America.
While some have argued that the reservations relating to matters
within the exclusive or essential jurisdiction of states are not necessary,
as international law does not relate to such matters, a sufficient number
of states seem to have doubts on the subject, and it would seem safer
to retain a reservation of this type. It might, however, be desirable
to change the Connally Amendment from a subjective unilateral de-
termination of the domestic character of a matter to a more objective
one, retaining at the same time sufficient control over the content of
this reservation. The most objectionable feature of the old reservation
was that it allowed a state to arbitrarily determine its content after a
case had already been brought before the International Court of Justice.
This may be avoided to a large extent by restricting the reservation
to "matters which traditionally, in the practice of the United States,
have been considered as essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
the United States." As Senator Thomas (Utah), the original proponent
of the idea that the United States accept the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court, pointed out, questions such as immigration and customs
19881
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tariffs are among "the vital matters over which the sovereign state
has traditionally exercised complete control" and would not be within
the jurisdiction of the Court.' 6 Senator Connally similarly referred to
these two examples, but added a reference to the regulation of tolls
through the Panama Canal. 7 They did not contemplate complete
arbitrariness but only the need to preserve the traditional rights of the
United States.
The proposed clause would enable the United States to prove in a
case that a particular matter, even if differently considered by other
states, has been traditionally classified in the practice of the United
States as essentially domestic. If on a certain matter a new rule of
international law should be accepted by other states, taking that matter
out of the domestic jurisdiction of states, it will remain domestic as
far as the United States is concerned as long as the United States
expressly rejects that new rule. Of course, it is generally agreed that
if the United States ratifies a treaty dealing with a matter previously
considered as domestic, the matter ceases to be domestic at least with
respect to disputes with other parties to the treaty.
National and collective security questions
(c) disputes relating to any question which affects the national security
of the United States of America or of a State party to a collective
security arrangement to which the United States of America is also
a party, except when one of the parties to the dispute has referred
the matter to the Security Council of the United Nations or the
appropriate regional collective security organization and the Security
Council or the organization has recommended that certain specific
legal questions be referred by the parties to the International Court
of Justice.
In view of the strong United States opposition to the Court's con-
sideration in the Nicaragua Case of questions affecting national security
or the security of allies connected with the United States by a collective
security arrangement, 8 it appears necessary to include a clause on the
subject in the proposed declaration. In the practice of states, several
such clauses have been employed.
16 92 CONG. REc. 10,615 (1946).
17 Id., at 10,695.
18 See Observations by the Department of State, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 423, 429 (1985).
For the Court's response, see the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and Against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 26-28, paras. 32-35.
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The proposed formula avoids the overly subjective character of a
similar reservation made by the United Kingdom in 195719 by declining
to state that the "opinion of the United States" shall be the sole
arbiter of whether a question affects its national security. The provision
relating to the Security Council is based upon the assumption that the
jurisdiction of the Court over a dispute would be terminated if the
United States should refer the dispute to the Security Council of the
United Nations, or a competent regional collective security organiza-
tion, on the ground that the dispute relates to a question affecting
the national security of the United States or of a state party to a
collective security arrangement to which the United States is also a
party. The self-judging element in this situation is reduced by the
proposal that the jurisdiction of the Court would revive if the Security
Council or the regional organization should recommend that certain
specific legal questions be referred by the parties (or by either of them)
to the International Court of Justice.2 0
It may also be suggested that in the light of the Nicaragua Case,
the United States should follow the example of El Salvador and India 21
19 That reservation, abandoned in the next United Kingdom declaration, excluded
from the Court's jurisdiction disputes "relating to any question which, in the opinion
of the Government of the United Kingdom, affects the national security of the United
Kingdom, affects the national security of the United Kingdom or of any of its dependent
territories." 1956-1957 I.C.J.Y.B. 224 (1957). A 1959 French declaration excluded
"disputes arising out of any war or international hostilities and disputes arising out
of a crisis affecting the national security or out of any measure or action relating
thereto." 1959-1960 I.C.J.Y.B. 240 (1960). In 1966, France added to this formula by
providing an exclusion for "disputes concerning activities connected with national
defence." 1966-1967 I.C.J.Y.B. 52 (1967). In 1973, France completely terminated its
declaration accepting the Court's jurisdiction. 1973-1974 I.C.J.Y.B. 49 (1974).Concerning
similar reservations contained in both bilateral and multilateral agreements, see Metzger,
The Connally Reservation and the World Court, JAG. J. Mar.-Apr. 1960, at 13, 15-
16.
10 The 1954 Australian declaration contained a similar provision, but one of a more
temporary character. It was based on pre-1939 declarations of the United Kingdom
and the other Commonwealth countries. The Australian declaration exempted from
the jurisdiction of the Court any dispute under consideration by the Security Council,
"provided that notice to suspend is given within ten days of the notification of the
initiation of the proceedings in the Court, and provided also that the suspension shall
be limited to a period of twelve months or such longer period as may be agreed by
the Parties to the dispute or determined by the Security Council." 1956-1957 I.C.J.Y.B.
209 (1957). Australia dbandoned this provision. 1974-1975 I.C.J.Y.B. 49 (1975).For
an early discussion of the merits of this approach, see Sohn, Exclusion of Political
Disputes from Judicial Settlement, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 694, 700 (1944).
11 For the declarations of El Salvador and India, which contain this exception, see
1985-1986 I.C.J.Y.B. 67, 72 (1986).
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by excluding from the jurisdiction of the Court "disputes relating to
or connected with facts or situations of hostilities, armed conflicts,
individual or collective actions taken in self-defense, resistance to ag-
gression, fulfillment of obligations imposed by international bodies,
and other similar or related acts, measures or situations in which the
United States is, has been or may in the future be involved." Given
the proposal discussed in the preceding paragraph, however, this sug-
gestion would have to be broadened by adding some reference near
the end not only to situations directly involving the United States, but
also situations in which "a State party to a collective or mutual security
treaty to which the United States is also a party" is involved. The
reference to a mutual security treaty has been added to take care of
bilateral mutual security treaties concluded between the United States
and a few foreign countries.
Although some would consider such a reservation extremely useful
from the point of view of protecting the United States from undesirable
complaints by other states, it is necessary to remember that any other
state would be entitled by reciprocity to invoke it against the United
States, thus depriving the reservation of its power to protect the
worldwide interests of its United States and its allies against encroach-
ments by other states.
Multilateral treaties
(d) disputes relating to the interpretation or application of a multi-
lateral treaty, unless all the parties to that treaty have agreed that
any decision rendered in any such dispute between two or more of
them will be binding upon all of them.
This proposed provision is related to the so-called Vandenberg
amendment, inserted in the 1946 United States declaration. Because of
the difficulties encountered in the Nicaragua Case,22 a different ap-
proach to this subject is taken in the new formula.
Senator Vandenberg proposed the old reservation with respect to
disputes arising under a multilateral treaty in order to answer objections
raised by John Foster Dulles. Dulles feared that the United States
could become bound by a decision of the Court relating to such a
2 For the Court's discussion of the Vanderberg amendment, see Nicaragua Case
(Merits), supra note 18, at 28-38, paras. 36-56. See also Damrosch, Multilateral
Disputes, in THE COURT AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 1, at 376, 393-99.
[Vol. 18:1
ACCEPTING ICJ JURISDICTION
treaty but other parties to the treaty would not be required to comply
with that decision and might not be subject to the Court's jurisdiction
for the purpose of ensuring such compliance.23 Some writers have
considered the Dulles proposal incomprehensible; clearly, it could have
been given substance by a better drafted text. In the form incorporated
in the United States 1946 Declaration, the Court in the jurisdictional
phase of the Nicaragua Case easily disregarded the provision, relying
on the ambiguity of the phrase "all parties to the treaty affected by
the decision."14 Though the Court applied the provision to some extent
in the decision on substance, the method employed deprived the pro-
vision of any effect on the case. 25
The basic United States concern is that any decision applicable to
the United States should also bind other states parties to the treaty
being interpreted by the Court. This is prevented by Article 59 of the
Statute of the Court, which provides that a "decision of the Court
has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case." If no parallel action can be brought against some
important parties to the treaty, they may contend that they are not
bound by the obligations the Court imposed on the United States.
Consequently, the United States may wish to restrict its obligation to
submit to the Court's jurisdiction to only those cases in which all
other affected parties have become parties to the case. Several other
countries went even further, requiring the participation in the case by
"all the parties to the treaty." ' 26 The new formula would apply to "all
.the parties" to the treaty, but does not require that all states parties
to the treaty must participate in the case. Instead they will have to
agree to accept the decision either in advance or after the decision has
been rendered. Such acceptance may be by separate declarations of
the states concerned or by a collective decision. The decision of the
Court would become binding on the United States only when all such
acceptances have been received by the Court or by the United States.
Unexpected complaint
(e) disputes submitted by a State which has accepted the jurisdiction
of the Court with respect to such disputes less than one year prior
Compulsory Jurisdiction [of the] International Court of Justice: Hearings before
a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
44 (1946).
24Nicaragua Case (Jurisdiction), supra note 6, at paras. 72-76.
25 Nicaragua Case (Merits), supra note 18, at 38, 92-97, paras. 56, 172-182.
- Nicaragua Case (Jurisdiction), supra note 6, at 424, para. 72 (citing declarations
of El Salvador, India and the Philippines).
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to the filing of the application bringing the dispute before the Court.
This provision would protect the United States against an attack
from an unexpected quarter, i.e., by a state not previously bound by
the optional clause contained in Article 36(2) of the Statute of the
Court. 2 To avoid such a surprise, the United Kingdom has excluded
from the jurisdiction of the Court any dispute "where the acceptance
of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on behalf of the other Party
to the dispute was deposited or ratified less than twelve months prior
to the filing of the application bringing the dispute before the Court. "21
The United States may safeguard its interests by a similar provision.
Even if this type of reservation had been made, another difficulty
may still arise because of the right of termination at a moment's notice
which is contained in many declarations. It makes possible for a state
to wait for a year, file an application against the United States, and
soon thereafter file a notice of termination of its own declaration in
order to protect itself against a retaliatory suit by the United States
or one of its allies. A suggestion has been made by Professor D'Amato
that to avoid such a case the United States may condition its acceptance
of the jurisdiction of the Court on "the presence of at least a six-
month notice of withdrawal provision in the declaration of the plaintiff
state."' 29 Of course, the plaintiff state can avoid the impact of such
a reservation by including in its declaration a six-month withdrawal
clause, filing a notice of termination, and suing the United States a
few days before its own declaration has expired.
If some restriction on this type of an application were desirable,
the United States could combine such a restriction with the one con-
tained in subparagraph 2(e), and exclude from the jurisdiction of the
Court "any dispute submitted to the Court by a party to the dispute
if at the time of the filing of the application the declaration of the
applicant state remained in force for less than one year or was subject
to termination by a notice of less than six months."
27 See D'Amato, Modifying U.S. Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of
the World Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 385, 387 (1985). D'Amato calls this ploy the
"sitting duck problem," and cites the Portuguese complaint against India which was
filed only three days after Portugal accepted the Court's jurisdiction. Id., note 4.
28 1985-9186 I.C.J.Y.B. 91 (1986).





3. This declaration may be modified or terminated with effect as
from the moment of expiration of six months after notice has been
given to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, except that in
relation to any state with a shorter period of termination, the noti-
fication by the United States of America shall take effect at the end
of such shorter period, and that in relation to any state which may
terminate its declaration as from the moment of notification, the
notification by the United States shall take effect as from the moment
of notification.
In the Nicaragua Case, the International Court of Justice held that
the April 1984 modification made by the United States with the intent
"to secure a partial and temporary termination" of the Court's ju-
risdiction with respect to Central American disputes, was invalid in
view of the six-month notice of termination required by the original
United States Declaration.30 The United States tried to rely, by reci-
procity, on the fact that the Nicaraguan declaration was of unlimited
duration and could therefore be terminated at any time; but the Court
held that even in such a case the principle of good faith requires a
reasonable period of notice and that a period of only a few days (from
April 6 to 9) did not amount to a "reasonable time."' 31
Of the declarations in force in 1986, twenty-five (more than half)
contained a clause allowing their termination by notice, usually in the
form of a notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
to take effect from the moment of such notification.3 2 Some of these
declarations provide expressly not only for termination but also for
additions to, or amendments of, reservations contained in the decla-
ration. In addition, as noted above, the Court has pointed out that
a declaration containing no statement about its duration may be ter-
minated by giving "reasonable" notice1 3 As there are currently nine
declarations which do not mention duration, only eleven declarations
remain that still have provisions, similar to the one in the terminated
United States declaration, requiring a six-month or a one-year notice.
Several of these are limited by the further requirement that such a
notice may be given only at predetermined intervals, usually five years.3 4
10 Nicaragua Case (Jurisdiction), supra note 6, at 417-19, paras. 58-61.
11 Id., at 419-20, para. 63.
32 1985-1986 I.C.J.Y.B. 61-92.
13 Supra note 31.
34 Id.
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In accordance with this general trend, it would seem that the United
States would be justified in abolishing the six-month notice requirement
and substituting a provision allowing termination or modification of
the declaration by notification to the Secretary-General, to take effect
at the moment of such notification. This would, however, diminish
even further the value of the declaration, and may encourage other
countries to do the same.
The formula suggested here would retain the six-month notice but
would afford adequate protection by ensuring more effective reciprocity
with respect to countries with a shorter period of notice.
IV. CONCLUSION ,-,
It is necessary to emphasize that the ability of the United States to
castigate other states for their non-acceptance of the jurisdiction of
the Court has been greatly diminished by the United States termination
of acceptance of that jurisdiction. On the other hand, future frustration
can be avoided by reconsidering the United States Declaration, clar-
ifying its provisions, and adding a few reservations which have become
common since 1946. Only by taking such action will the United States
be able to reclaim its image as the main defender of world order under
law and the opponent of those whose lawless acts rely on brute force.
The United States government should also take into account that many
countries consider that international law can better protect their interests
than can their limited ability to defend themselves against ruthless
neighbors; and that these countries are thus inclined to accept the
Court's jurisdiction, and will do so with a little encouragement. Con-
sequently, any improvements in the terms of the United States dec-
laration would enable the United States, by reciprocity, to more
effectively protect its own citizens and corporations against violations
of international law by these countries. The United States is not likely
to use force against these countries, but it might be able to use the
law and the prestige of the Court to ensure compliance with their
international obligations.
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